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The paper aims at extending the debate on Environmental Kuznets Curves to the
case of non-renewable resources and to discuss the driving forces that might give rise
to EKC's in this case.
The paper at hand deviates from the standard EKC analysis in two ways: First,
mostly EKC's are analyzed for °ow variables. In this paper we argue that EKC's may
very well arise for certain stock variables like minerals or waste. Second, most papers
that provide a theoretical foundation for EKC's focus on assumptions like technological
anomalies (e.g. increasing returns) or technological switches. We o®er an alternative
explanation by showing that EKC's might arise simply due to the combination of
recycling and the rising scarcity of materials.
It is shown that an EKC for non-renewables might emerge during the transition
to the long-run balanced growth path. Whether or not an EKC arises depends e.g.
on initial conditions, but also on preferences and technology.
The assumptions made about the ability of recycling ¯rms to internalize the in-
terrelation between recycling decisions today and the future availability of recyclable
waste matter with respect to the prerequisites for an EKC and the speed of conver-
gence. Internalization furthermore implies that an economy can be caught in a poverty
trap, i.e. it might not be able to converge to the long-run growth equilibrium if the
initial endowment with resources and capital is too low.
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Kuznets Curve
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The last decade has witnessed an ever increasing interest in the Environmental Kuznets
Curve (EKC) hypotheses. Postulating that environmental deterioration increases during
early phases of economic development, yet decreases again in later stages, it has sometimes
even be seen as the long-sought solution for environmental problems caused by economic
development per se. Although this very optimistic view has faded, the topic in general
should not be discarded so easily. Even though it remains dubitable whether an EKC
exists with respect to an aggregate environmental indicator, the phenomenon has been
observed empirically for a number of specic pollutants and indicators. Yet, a thorough
theoretical foundation for the observed relation between income and environmental quality
has long been missing. Only recently attention has gradually shifted to the theoretical
underpinnings of the observed EKC's. Within the evolving literature, the EKC pattern has
typically been attributed to either increasing returns to abatement (Andreoni/Levinson
2001, Egli/Steger 2005), technology switches (Smulders/Bretschger/Egli 2005) or sectoral
changes (de Groot 1999).
The paper at hand deviates from this kind of standard EKC analysis in two ways:
In many cases EKC's were observed for 
ow variables as SO2- or NOx-emissions, less so
for stock variables like household waste. In this paper we argue that EKC's may very
well arise for certain stock variables. In our case this is the case for waste that arises
from the use and discarding of materials like copper or iron. Besides deviating from the
standard literature by regarding environmental stock variables, we furthermore consider an
alternative explanation for the emergence of EKC's. Instead of relying on assumptions like
technological anomalies (as ever increasing returns to scale in abatement) or technological
switches, we show that EKC's might arise simply due to the combination of recycling and
the rising scarcity of materials. Due to the dierent timing of the generation of waste and
recycling, the waste stock might initially rise and then decline over time.
A phenomenon like this has, for example, been suggested for the case of copper. The
potentially recyclable share of copper is close to 100%, very little is lost due to dissipation.
Remaining reserves have been estimated to amount to 470 MMT (US Geological Survey
2005, p. 55)1 while the peak of production is projected at levels of 50 to 60 MMT per year
for sometime between 2055 and 2085 (depending on the assumed scenario with respect
to recycling technologies, population and income behavior, see Ayres et al. 2001). This
necessarily implies that more and more of the demand has to be met by recycled materials.
1This estimation encompasses those resources which could presently be extracted or produced at rea-
sonable costs. The complete resource base, i.e. those already identied resources that \meet specied
minimum physical and chemical criteria related to current mining and production practices, including
those for grade, quality, thickness, and depth" (US Geological Survey, p. 193) would amount to 940 MMT.
This estimation additionally includes resources with the potential for becoming economically available
within reasonable planning horizons.
1Taking into account that the copper used in production will often be bound in the produced
goods for a considerable number of years, this suggests that \the recycling rate for copper
will necessarily approach 100%, probably before the end of the present century" (Ayres et
al. 2001, p. 96).2
In the following we consider a very simple economy that employs a non-renewable
resource, e.g. copper, in production. This material input can either stem from virgin
resources or be produced from copper waste by recycling. Material inputs are produced
by two types of rms: virgin resource extractors on the one hand and recycling rms on the
other. As in the case of copper we abstract from dissipation processes and assume that the
employed materials could completely be recovered from the produced output.3 Whether
or not materials do return to the environment, i.e. to the stock of waste, depends on their
usage: those goods that are used for investment in the capital stock, remain bound in the
capital stock. Those which are part of the consumed output are released again, return to
the waste stock and can be taken from the waste stock again for later recycling.
We explicitly include a material balance condition in order to integrate the material

ows properly into the model. This condition which was also employed by Pittel et al.
(2005) re
ects Lavoisier's law by ensuring that every material that served as an input to
production is accounted for during the entire material 
ow cycle, i.e. material can only
be converted but never be destroyed.4
With respect to the recycling rms we make two types of assumptions about the
externalities arising in the recycling sector. Firstly we assume that recycling rms do
not take into account that at least part of the material they recycle will return to the
waste heap after consumption. In this case rms implicitly consider materials to be a
non-renewable resource. In a second scenario we modify this scenario by assuming that
recycling rms are aware of back-
ow of materials and consider this in their output and
pricing decision. Consequently the price of recycled waste does not follow the Hotelling
path anymore, but takes into account the quasi-renewability of the waste stock.
With respect to the remaining set-up of the model we choose the simplest framework
possible as the focus of the paper is on the environmental dimension, i.e. the EKC property,
rather than on the driving forces of growth.5
2The rising importance of recycling with respect to other resources such as aluminum, iron and lead,
but also glas and paper is also stressed by e.g. van Beukering 2001, van Beukering/Bouman 2001, OECD
2001 and Fullerton/Kinnaman 2002.
3This is admittedly a special case that approximates reality only in a limited range of materials.
4In recent years, some attempts have been made to integrate recycling into a macroeconomic dynamic
framework (Mainwaring 1995, Musu/Lines 1995, Huhtala 1999, Conrad 1999, di Vita 2001, Kuhn et al.
2003). But except for a few examples (e.g. Huhtala 1999) these approaches lack a sound material balance
foundation.
5Examples of papers that focus more on growth and the implications of exhaustible resources being an
essential input to production (although neither recycling nor material balances are considered), see e.g.
Aghion/Howitt 1998, Scholz and Ziemes 1999, Schou 2001, 2002, Groth/Schou 2002, and Grimaud/Roug e
2We show that an EKC can, but not necessarily has to arise during the transition to
the balanced growth path. Whether or not the waste stock follows a hump-shaped path
depends on the parametrization, the endowments with virgin resources and waste and also
the market structure and externalities arising in the recycling sector. Along the balanced
growth path the waste stock is decreasing monotonically over time. As waste can be
considered as a valuable resource in our model, not recycling part of it cannot be optimal
in the long-run.
The paper proceeds as follows: The following section introduces the model. In section
3 we then take a short look at the balanced growth path of the economy. Subsequently,
in section 4, shows under which circumstances an EKC might arise in general and derives
the specic transitional dynamics of the model. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
We consider a very simple closed economy which is in some respects close to the setup of
Pittel et al. (2005). As in Pittel et al., an explicit material balance condition is considered
for the material inputs employed in the economy. The material inputs originally stem from
the essential input of a non-renewable resource in production. The part of the materials
that is discarded as waste after consumption can later be recycled. Whether these mate-
rials already have been recycled or not, is of consequence for future recycling possibilities.
The present paper deviates from Pittel et al. (2005) by simplifying the driving forces be-
hind growth considerably. While in Pittel et al. (2005) growth is driven endogenously by
R&D and gains from specialization, growth results in the paper at hand from exogenous
technological change. This assumption is of course simplistic as technological advance-
ments fall like manna from heaven. Yet, the aim of this paper is not to explain why and
how growth is driven, but rather why and how an EKC with respect to material waste can
arise. The causes and consequences that are decisive for this EKC pattern are unrelated
to the source of growth. So, while it would be possible to draw the same conclusions from
a more complicated endogenously driven growth model,6 it seems more straightforward to
choose the simplest framework in which it is still possible to explain the forces leading to
the EKC.
With respect to consumption the modelling is quite standard. The representative
household derives utility from consumption C and maximizes discounted lifetime utility
2003, 2005.
6One possible option would i.e. be to extend the paper by Pittel et al. (2005) which focuses on the
balanced growth path by an analysis of the transitional dynamics. Yet, applying their framework here
would only add to analytical complexity without enhancing the understanding of the EKC pattern.





U(C(t))e tdt UC > 0; UCC < 0 (1)
s.t. _ K =
dK
dt
= rK   C
where  is the discount rate. K denotes household wealth which is equal to the stock of
capital in the economy. The wage rate is given by w while r is the interest rate. For sim-
plicity we assume that each consumer supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Household's




 6= 1;  > 0: (2)





(r   ): (3)
There are three types of rms in the economy: Final output producers, resource ex-
tracting rms and recycling rms. All rms operate under perfect competition. The
homogeneous nal output is produced from labor L, capital C and an index of material
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where A denotes the level of technology which grows at the exogenously given constant
rate gA.
All materials that are available for production purposes in our economy originally stem
from a stock of non-renewable virgin resources: Virgin materials are extracted from the
given stock and used in production. Residuals of production processes and/or consumption
are then discarded as waste. The accumulated waste can again be considered as a kind
of `ore pile' from which secondary materials are taken for recycling. The parameters 

and  show how productive a unit of the virgin resource is compared to a unit of recycled
materials. By choosing a Cobb-Douglas type production function we implicitly assume
both types of materials are essential to production. The Cobb-Douglas function should
be viewed as a limit case of a more general technology.
Using (4), it can easily be seen that prot maximization of rms leads to the well
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where pZ and pWR denote the prices for virgin resources and recycled waste.
4Of the nal output produced, one part is consumed while the rest is used for inves-
tive purposes. Assuming that capital is not depreciated in the course of production, the
equilibrium condition for the capital market reads
_ K = Y   C; 0 < C < Y: (6)
As capital and consumption goods are produced by the same technology the share of
materials in newly created capital goods is identical to the share of materials in consumer
goods. If a unit of output is invested, the materials bound in this unit become bound in the
capital stock and are not discarded as waste. Abstracting from depreciation here implies
that those materials that are bound in capital are bound there forever.7 If an output unit
is consumed however, its material content is discarded to the waste stock. Over time these
residuals accumulate and can be used as the source of secondary materials for recycling.
The only way to decrease the waste stock is to recycle waste and employ the recycled
waste again in production. The material balance equation for this economy consequently
reads8




At each point in time the share C
Y of the materials employed in production returns to the
waste pile while WR is taken of the waste stock for recycling. If more materials return than
are taken of the pile, the waste pile increases over time while it decreases if more materials
are recycled then discarded. An EKC conformable pattern would therefore require that
at early stages of the development process the waste pile increases while it decreases in
later periods.
It is assumed that at t = 0 there exist a stock of the virgin resource S0 as well as a
stock of waste W0 that has already been accumulated during past production periods. At
each point of time the producers of nal goods decide upon the amounts of virgin resources
and recycled waste they employ in production. Intertemporal consumer preferences and
technologies then determine the share of nal products devoted to capital accumulation
and consumption and therefore also decide on the amounts of waste generated at each
point in time.
For simplicity we assume that no costs arise in the production of the two material
inputs. This assumption is of course not entirely realistic, yet the inclusion of production
costs in these sectors would again not add to the explanation the basic mechanism driving
the emergence of an EKC curve.
With respect to the optimizing behavior of resource extracting rms it seems reasonable
to assume that rms have no incentive to internalize the positive eect their provision of
7As the material content of output might change over time, dierent units of the capital stock can
be heterogeneous with respect to their material intensity. As we made the additional restriction that
0 < C < Y this feature can be ignored. If a shrinking economy were considered however, a vintage
approach should be employed.
8For a more detailed derivation and motivation of the material balance condition see Pittel et al. (2005).
5virgin resources has on the re
ux of materials onto the waste pile. Firms thus maximize









s.t. _ S =  Z: (9)
The rst-order and transversality conditions are given by
pZe 
R t
0 r(s)ds =   (10)
_  = 0 (11)
lim
t!1
S = 0 (12)
where  denotes the costate variable. Using (10) to (12) we can derive the familiar
Hotelling rule for the optimal price path of the exhaustible resource Z
gpZ = r: (13)
With respect to the behavior of the recycling rms we distinguish between the following
two scenarios: First (Scenario 1), we assume that the recycling rms do not take into
account that part of the materials they recycle returns to the waste pile after consumption,
i.e. the development of the waste stock is in this case exogenous to the rms. The logic is
that a single rm does not realize its own impact on the development of the waste stock
as the market share of a single producer is very small. In the second scenario (Scenario 2),
we assume that the re
ux of materials is not exogenous to the rm. Even if the market
share of a single rm is very small, this endogeneity could, e.g., result if rms are forced
to take back their own waste after consumption.
As the recycling rms in Scenario 1 do not internalize the re
ux of materials to the
waste heap, the waste stock has the characteristics of a non-renewable resource to them.
Consequently, their prot maximization is of the same type as the optimization faced by
the virgin resource extractors, such that the price of WR also follows the Hotelling path.
Yet, if rms internalize the re
ux, the waste stock is a renewable resource to them. With
respect to the optimal development of the price for recycled waste, pWR, this leads, as will
be shown, to a modied version of the Hotelling rule.
As an example consider the reuse of scrap cars for recycling purposes. Assume that
there exist rms that provide recycled car steel for intermediate products, in this case
car bodies. Now two alternative scenarios can be thought of: a) Scrap cars are simply
dumped on a general junkyard, such that the availability of recyclable steel from these
cars and the original provision of recycled steel is not { in the eyes of a single rms {
directly linked. This case would be consistent with the rst scenario in which the re
ux
of materials is considered to be exogenous to the rms. b) Automobile producers could
6be regulated in the sense that they have the obligation to take back the scrap cars of their
own brand. Handing these cars down to the rms that originally provided the recycled
steel then creates a direct link between the provision and the re
ow of recycled materials,
such that the re
ow becomes endogenous to the recycling rms { as assumed in the second
scenario.












When recycling rms do not internalize the re
ux of materials this implies that  WR is




0 r(s)ds =  !1 (15)
_ !1 = 0 (16)
lim
t!1
!1W = 0 (17)
where !1 denotes the costate variable for W in Scenario 1. When recycling rms do
internalize the re
ux of materials, i.e.  WR = WR is endogenous, optimization gives
pWRe 
R t




_ !2 = 0 (19)
lim
t!1
!2W = 0 (20)
with !2 being the costate variable for W in this second scenario.
Combining (16) with (17) { resp. (19) with (20) { shows that it is optimal for recycling
rms to exhaust the complete stock of waste for recycling purposes when time goes to
innity. As the waste stock is a source of productive inputs, rms have an incentive to
exploit the prot possibilities associated with this stock of materials. Not recycling part
of the waste and leaving it on the waste pile cannot be optimal as recycled materials are a
scarce and essential input to production. Yet, it will be shown that the waste stock might
increase temporarily in early stages of economic development, thus leading to an EKC for
materials.
From (15) to (17) we can again show that the standard Hotelling rule also holds for
the price of recycled waste in Scenario 1:
gpWR1 = r: (21)
7From (18) to (20), however, it follows that in the second scenario the price of WR follows
gpWR2 = r +
C
Y   C
(gY   gC) (22)
where (21) is enhanced by the additional term on the right. This term re
ects in which
way an additional unit of recycling today aects the development of the share of materials
that can again by employed in recycling in the future. If, e.g., the savings rate rises
over time (gY   gC > 0), this implies that of the recycled and virgin resources used in
production, a higher and higher share does not return to the waste heap, but is bound in
capital. In this case a marginal increase of recycling has a negative eect on the re
ux of
materials. This increases the opportunity cost of extraction, thereby inducing rms to ask
for a higher compensation for recycling. Consequently the growth rate of pWR2 exceeds
the interest rate. The described eect arises because the waste can be characterized as
a renewable resource when the re
ux of material is endogenized. Changes in the savings
rate aect the `regeneration' rate, i.e. the re
ux of material, such that the Hotelling rule
has to be enhanced by a `regenerability' term. Along the balanced growth path, along
which gY   gC = 0, this term vanishes as the savings rate is constant and we are back at
the standard Hotelling rule (21).
3 Balanced Growth Path
For the given economy the derivation of the decentralized balanced growth path (BGP)9
is quite straightforward due to the simple structure of the model. Nevertheless the results
are interesting in two respects: On the one hand it can be shown that the growth rate of
output as well as the development of the waste stock along the balanced growth path do
not depend on whether or not the waste stock externality described above is internalized
by the rms or not. On the other hand it is interesting to note that a higher productivity
of the material inputs actually hurts growth.
With respect to the price for virgin resources and also the price of recycled waste
in Scenario 1, we have already shown in the previous section that they always grow at
the interest rate. As we have also seen, this does not have to hold with respect to the
price of recycled waste in Scenario 2, see (22). Yet, as along the BGP consumption and
output grow at the same rate, we can easily see that in equilibrium the pWR grows at the
(constant) interest rate as well.
Expressing the production function (4) as well as the rst order conditions for Z and
WR from (5) in terms of growth rates, considering the Hotelling rules and taking into
account that along the BGP gY = gK has to hold, the equilibrium interest rate can be








where a hat denotes the value of a variable along the BGP. Substituting this expression











As to be expected ^ g depends positively on the rate of technical progress as an increase in
gA raises the productivity of capital. The productivities of the material inputs,  and 
,
on the other hand aect the long-run growth rate negatively. The more productive virgin
and recycled resources are, the more the decrease of the materials' input over time hurts
growth.
Dierentiating the rst order conditions for Z and WR in (5) with respect to time and
equating the resulting expressions shows that the growth rates of the values of the two
material inputs are equalized in equilibrium:
gZ + gpZ = gWR + gpWR: (25)
Considering furthermore that both prices in (25) grow at the same rate, shows that in the
long-run equilibrium the extraction of virgin resources and the amount of recycled waste
have to grow at the same rates. Using (23) and (24), if follows that the balanced growth
rates of the two material inputs are equal to














)+gA <  has to hold for the material inputs' growth rates to
be negative. As it follows from the equation of motion of S, (9), that along the BGP
gZ = gS < 0 while (25) implies that gZ = gWR, the negativity of gZ and gWR has to hold
in equilibrium.
With respect to the development of the waste pile, we already know from the transver-
sality conditions (17) and (20) respectively, that W has to decrease over time for the
equilibrium to be optimal. Dividing (7) by W and dierentiating the resulting expression
with respect to time shows furthermore that in the long-run equilibrium the growth rates
of the waste stock and the growth rate of the recycled waste have to be equal gW = gWR.
4 Transitional Dynamics
Assume now that the starting values of the economic variables are not such that the
economy is and will forever remain on the balanced path. We will show that in this case
the transitional dynamics can give rise to an EKC compatible development of the waste
stock. Let us rst take a look at general conditions that have to hold for an EKC to arise
and then turn to the specic transitional dynamics of this model.
94.1 Prerequisites for an EKC
A humped shape curve for the waste stock would imply that waste accumulates at a
positive rate early in the transition process while in later stages the accumulation rate
becomes negative. As optimizing rms will exhaust the waste pile when time goes to
innity, we already know that at some development stage the accumulation rate will
become negative. By looking at the equation of motion for waste

















it becomes furthermore clear that whether the waste stock is increasing or decreasing
in early stages depends on the development of the consumption share of output, initial
resource extraction and recycling, and and the development of the price for virgin resources
and recycled waste. The initial values of the variables as well as their development over
time depend crucially on the assumptions made about the initial stocks in the economy.
Given that recycling rms take the development of W to be exogenous (Scenario 1),
the prices of both material resources rise at rate the same rate, r, and (27) can be rewritten
as
















such that the sign of _ W depends solely on the term in brackets. It can easily be seen
that, if initial recycling is relatively low compared to virgin resource extraction while C
Y is
relatively high and then decreases during transition, the term in brackets might initially
be positive and then become negative over time. This would imply that, while waste might
be accumulating during early stages of economic development, it might 'decumulate' in
later stages, thereby leading to the familiar EKC pattern. Consequently, an EKC type
of development would be more likely to arise in an economy in which the savings rate is
initially low. As a necessary condition for an EKC to arise, an increasing savings rate
during transition can be identied. This seems to be in line with the empirics of economic
development. While early in the development process the savings rate tends to be low,
when countries grows richer, households rise the part of their income devoted to savings.
With respect to the ratio between recycling and virgin resource extraction, it remains
constant due to our assumption that the two material inputs are perfect substitutes and
due to the fact that their prices increase at the same rate.
Rewriting (28) in terms of initial values and growth rates only, we can show that for
an EKC to arise, the following condition has to hold for some t <  t where  t marks the
point in time when the stock of waste becomes maximal:
e
R t









10This condition is rather intuitive as it implies that an EKC arises only if initial resource
extraction is not too low compared recycling. If at t = 0 recycling is already quite high,
the peak of the EKC has already been passed. During the transition the term on the LHS
rises over time, such that in the long run _ W < 0 holds.
If recyclers take the re
ux of materials to be endogenous, transitional dynamics may
also be compatible with an EKC. Due to the dierent development of the prices for recycled
waste and virgin resources during the transition, an EKC might even arise if the savings
rate is decreasing over time. Recalling the pricing rule for recycled waste, (22), (27) can
now be rewritten as





















Consider a decrease of C
Y during transition, which was identied as a necessary condition
for an EKC to arise in Scenario 1. In this case the increase in the savings rate induces the
growth rate of pWR to exceed the interest rate, i.e. the price for recycled materials rises
faster during the transition than the price for virgin resources. Compared to Scenario 1,
the input of recycled waste in relation to virgin resource extraction now changes during
transition. Over time, when the savings rate approaches its long-run value, the growth
rates of the two material inputs converge and along the balanced path the two extraction
rates are again equal.



















has to hold for some t <  t.
4.2 Transitional dynamics and stability
In the following we take a look at the local stability properties and the linearized saddle
path along which the system converges to the steady state. From the analytical results of
this analysis we can draw some conclusions about when economic development might give
rise to an EKC.
4.2.1 Local stability properties
Scenario 1
To analyze the transitional dynamics we rst rewrite the dynamic system in variables
that are constant along the BGP. For the economy at hand this stationary system consists
















11which all grow at a rate of zero along the BGP. Expressing the dynamic system in these










































As (32) and (33) do not depend on zs, wRw and zw, we only consider these two equations
in order to establish the stability properties of the system. Linearizing (32) and (33) and
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A necessary and sucient condition for the system to be saddle-path stable is jDNIj < 0
which can easily be seen to hold for (37) with jDNIj =  (1   )^ yk^ ck < 0. Making use of
the characteristic equation, the stable negative eigenvalue of the non-integrated scenario































 ^ yk > 0 due to the transversality condition for K.
To visualize the dynamics of the system graphically, consider the isoclines and saddle
path of the system. The isoclines are given by yk = 
  ck  

  (for _ ck = 0) and
yk =
gA
(1 ) (for _ yk = 0). It can easily be seen that for (  ) > 0 the slope of ck-isocline
is positive and larger than unity (see Figure 1) while it is negative for (   ) < 0 (see
Figure 2).
As we cannot solve for the saddle path of the system analytically, Figure 1 and 2 each
depict a simulated saddle path SD which was numerically approximated using the the
12ck
yk
_ yk = 0
SP SPl _ ck = 0
^ yk
_ k = 0
^ ck
Figure 1: Transitional dynamics for  >  (Scenario 1)
backward integration procedure as suggested by Brunner and Strulik (2002). Furthermore








































was computed (for the derivation see Appendix A) which gives an analytical expression
for the dynamics around the steady state.
_ k = 0
ck
yk
_ yk = 0





Figure 2: Transitional dynamics for  <  (Scenario 1)
To see whether and when an EKC might arise during transition, consider Figures 1 and
2. From (40) we see that the slope of SDl is positive (negative) for    > 0 (   < 0).
13For  >  it can easily be established that the slope of the saddle path is larger than
unity. This implies that for a transition from below, yk rises faster than ck. Consequently
ck
yk = C
Y falls, i.e. the savings rate rises. This decline in the consumption-output ratio
was identied in the previous section as a necessary prerequisite for an EKC to arise.
Given that
ck
yk is initially above its long-run value, yk falls faster during transition than ck
implying a decreasing savings rate. Consequently, for a transition from above EKC will
not arise.
For  <  the result is analogous. Starting from below the steady state, ck falls while
yk rises during transition. The implicated fall of C
Y might give rise to an EKC. For a
transition from above, the savings rate again falls during transition, such that an EKC
cannot arise.
But even if we are facing a transition from below, this does not necessarily imply an
EKC-type development as this depends crucially on the strength of the increase in the
savings rate. The stronger the increase, the stronger the eect on net recycling. How
much the savings rate increases depends a) on the initial distance to the steady state





ck. The increase in the savings rate is the stronger, the lower the consumption
elasticity along the saddle path.
We can now make use of the analytical expression for the linearized saddle path to
show how the elasticity and therefore the scope of an EKC to arise depends on the model
parameters.
From (38) and (40) it follows that the elasticity depends negatively on , such that for
higher impatience an EKC is more likely to arise. Given a higher value of  households save
less in the long as well as in the short run. Yet, the short-run reaction of the savings rate
is stronger than the long-run reaction, such that for a higher  the savings rate increases
more sharply during transition.
With respect to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, , its eect on the devel-
opment of the savings rate is ambiguous. In the long-run the savings rate unambiguously
falls, yet the eect on the development of the savings rate during transition is less clear.
It can be shown that the short-run reaction of s falls short of the long-run reaction given
any initial value of yk. It might even be the case that the initial savings rate rises for
higher values of . As a consequence the elasticity of consumption with respect to output
may rise or fall due to an increase of . While the long-run decrease of the savings rate
lowers the consumption elasticity, this eect might be oset by the simultaneous decrease
in 'real' impatience

 following an increase in .
Finally, the transitional eect of a rise in the rate of technological progress, gA, depends
on  7 . For  >  an increase in gA induces a fall in the consumption elasticity thereby
making an EKC more likely to arise. Yet, for  <  the elasticity rises which lowers
the scope for an EKC. The dependency of  7  mirrors the eects that an increase in
14gA exerts on the savings rate via the marginal productivity of capital. In the long-run,
the faster rising productivity of capital leads { independently of  7  { to a higher
savings rate, but in the short-run s might rise or fall, depending on  7 . For  < 
the substitution eect dominates the income eect. This implies that for a rise in gA the
increase in the initial savings rate overshoots the long-run increase. Consequently, the
increase of the savings rate during transition decreases with increasing gA. For  > 
the opposite holds. The dominance of income over substitution eect leads to an initial
decrease of savings. As a result the increase in the savings rate during transition is the
stronger the higher gA, raising the scope of an EKC to arise.
Scenario 2
Assume now that while resource extracting rms do not consider the re
ux of materials
in their optimization, waste recyclers do. With respect to the development of the price of
the virgin resource, gpZ = r still holds. Yet, with respect to the price of recycled waste,
the optimal price path is given by (22). Taking this result into account we can now again













































The equations of motion for zs, zw and wRw are aected by the change in the time path
of gY , but the resulting system of dierential equations is still recursive in these variables.
By inspecting (41) the impact of the modied Hotelling rule for the behavior of the
system during the transition becomes clear. As the modied pricing of recycled waste
aects output growth via its eect on the input of recycled waste, the additional terms
appearing in (41) compared to (32) are weighted by the production elasticity of recycled
waste . It can easily be seen that if all -containing terms were missing we would be
back at Scenario 1.
The term B = 
ck=yk
1 ck=yk re
ects the eect that the modied pricing rule for WR exerts
via the growth rate of recycling on the growth rate of output. Remember that the growth
rate of recycling prices in Scenario 2 depends on gY as well as on gC (see (22)). A ceteris
paribus rise in output growth increases the growth rate of gpWR and thereby speeds up the
exhaustion of the waste pile which reduces output growth. This eect is re
ected by the
appearance of B in the denominator of (41). Furthermore the development of recycling
prices in Scenario 2 depends on the growth rate of consumption. A ceteris paribus rise
in gC lowers the growth rate of the price for recycled waste thereby aecting output
growth positively. This eect is captured by the two additional,  containing terms. This
feedback eect of consumption growth on output growth is positive if consumption grows
15at a positive rate.10
Again we can calculate the negative eigenvalue, , the linearized saddle path, SDl, and
the isoclines for ck and yk. While inspection of (42) already shows that the ck-isocline
remains the same as under Scenario 1, _ yk = 0 from (41) is now a quadratic function of
yk. This gives rise to an isocline which consists of two separate parts (see Figure 3 and
4) with two intersections of the ck-isocline and the bipartite yk-isocline. The intersection
of the upper part of the yk-isocline and _ ck = 0 represents the steady state of the system
which is { as in the previous section { given by ck = ^ ck and yk = ^ yk. In contrast to this
steady state, the intersection between _ ck = 0 and (the lower part of) the yk-isocline does
not constitute an equilibrium. At this intersection ck = yk =

, i.e. C
Y = 1. Yet for a
consumption-output ratio of unity (41) is not dened. This is due to the fact that for
C
Y = 1 no equilibrium on the market for recycled waste exists. For C
Y = 1 the savings
rate is equal to zero and no capital is accumulated. This implies that the entire recycled
waste returns to the waste stock after consumption. Consequently no opportunity costs
of recycling arise and on a competitive market the optimal price of recycled waste would
be equal to zero. Yet for a price of zero no market equilibrium exists, as the demand for
recycled waste becomes innite while its supply is limited.
For the steady state (^ ck; ^ yk) we can now again determine the local stability properties.
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d1 = (1   h) ^ yk















(^ yk ^ ck)+^ ck < 1.
h re
ects that ceteris paribus changes of ck and yk in Scenario 2 aect _ yk also via












in (37) and (43)
for example. Given that no feedback arises from a change in ck to the recycling markets
(Scenario 1), a change in ck aects gyk only via its eect on capital accumulation. On
the one hand gyk falls as gY falls due to the slower accumulation of capital, on the other
hand gyk rises as the fall of gK directly increases the growth of the output-capital ratio.
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Figure 3: Transitional dynamics for  <  (Scenario 2)
Without feedback eects of the recycling market, both eects exactly cancel for the given
specication. In Scenario 2, however, the fall in output growth induced by the fall in gK
is less strong. The feedback loop from output growth to recycling and vice versa implies
that the reduction of gY lowers the growth rate of recycling prices and thereby slows down
the exhaustion of the waste pile which fosters output growth. The eect is dampened by
the simultaneous decrease of the savings rate s = 1 
ck
yk. Summing up, the net eect of a
change in ck on gyk is now positive.










is analogous. In both scenarios
the term  (1   )^ yk re
ects that a change of yk aects capital accumulation negatively.
In Scenario 1 this constitutes the only link between _ yk and yk. The dierence between
Scenario 1 and 2 arises due to the eect of a change in yk on the marginal product of
capital. In Scenario 2 this aects the development of yk due to the direct link between
consumption and output growth. Consider for example a rise in yk. Due to the higher
marginal product of capital, consumption growth rises or falls depending on whether the
income or substitution eect dominates ( ? 1). Given that, for example, the substitution
eect dominates ( < 1), gC rises and accelerates the increase of output growth and
therefore _ yk.
The determinant of DI can again be shown to be negative:
jDIj =  h(1   )^ ck^ yk < 0; (44)
such that the system is still locally saddle-path stable. Employing again the backward
integration procedure shows that the local stability property extends to the global case
for yk >

 (see the simulated saddle paths SP in Figure 3 and Figure 4).
The system only converges to the steady state if the initial yk exceeds

. Consequently,
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Figure 4: Transitional dynamics for  <  (Scenario 2)
that an output-capital-ratio of yk >

 cannot be reached, the economy never converges
to the long-run growth equilibrium. Given that C=Y < 1 (as assumed), the growth rate
of capital exceeds the growth rate of consumption in the long-run and the consumption-
capital-ratio goes to zero, as can be seen from the arrows in Figure 3 and 4. If the economy
even starts below the lower part of the yk-isocline, but above _ k = 0, capital growth rst
dominates output growth until the isocline is passed and the output-capital ratio starts
to rise. Over time the economy converges to (ck;yk) = (0; ^ yk).11
If we abstract for a moment from the assumption C < Y and allow for capital decumu-
lation, it becomes clear that in Scenario 1, even an economy that is poorly endowed with
material resources and physical capital can always jump onto the saddle path and con-
verge to the long-run equilibrium. Initially it may face a shrinking economy with negative
consumption, capital and output growth, but, when the marginal product of capital has
increased enough to render it attractive for households to save, growth becomes positive
and the economy converges towards its long-run growth equilibrium.
In Scenario 2 the situation of a poorly endowed economy is worse. The development
of a country that initially possesses too little material resources and physical capital can
be compared to a kind of poverty trap that makes it impossible for the economy to reach
a long-run growth equilibrium. Given an initial Y
K <

, the economy can either exhibit
a relatively low initial consumption level, i.e. _ k > 0, in which case the economy develops
in the above described way towards (ck;yk) = (0; ^ yk). Or it can start with a relatively
high consumption level, such that _ k < 0. In this case the decumulation of capital implies
that for every unit of output produced, more recycled waste than employed in production
11(ck;yk) = (0; ^ yk) does not represent an equilibrium of the system. For yk = ^ yk, the consumers
would prefer an consumption-capital ratio of ck = ^ ck, such that the economy would jump to its long-run
equilibrium which would violate the Kenyes-Ramsey condition (3).
18returns to the waste heap. So the scarcity of waste is actually decreasing as the waste
heap increases. In Scenario 1 this is of course also the case for a decumulating capital
stock, but as rms do not realize the impact of their production decisions on the 
ow-back
of materials to the waste stock, they still perceive waste to become more and more scarce
over time. As they do not perceive the waste stock as a renewable resource, they set the
price according to the Hotelling rule. In Scenario 2 rms do perceive the waste stock as a
renewable resource and realize that when they recycle one more unit, more than this one
unit returns to the waste stock. The waste stock increases and the optimal price for the
recycled waste becomes negative.12 This could, e.g., be the case of a government which,
in the face of an increasing waste stock, subsidizes recycling to induce rms to recycle
more. Facing the increasing waste stock rms are paid to employ more recycled waste in
production. Perceiving this as a form of further income rms do employ more recycled
waste in production, but at the same time they decumulate capital in order to increase the
waste stock further and be therefore eligible for more subsidies. We face a self-fullling
prophecy: Recycling is subsidized because the waste stock increases and the waste stock
increases because recycling is subsidized.
In this case, the internalization of the recycling market failure in Scenario 2 compared
to Scenario 1 actually implies that economies in which recycling rms act oblivious, may
be better of in the long-run. While they can, independently of their endowment with
capital and materials, always converge to the long-run equilibrium, this does not hold in
Scenario 2. So, knowing more might be not be an advantage in this case. Poor economies
that start in the non-convergence region would face an increasing waste heap over time
while an EKC or even continuously decreasing waste heap would not be attainable.
If yk(0) >

 the economy converges to the long-run equilibrium. For  > , consump-
tion, capital and output grow at a positive rate during a transition from below, and, as the
slope of the saddle path exceeds one, an EKC curve might arise. Equivalently, an EKC
type development is possible for  <  and a transition from below.











































+ 4h(1   )^ ck^ yk: (45)
The transversality condition again ensures that the rst term on the RHS is positive.
Comparing (45) to (39) shows that the presence of h constitutes the only dierence between
the negative eigenvalues in Scenario 1 and 2.
12It is of course the absence of recycling costs which implies that optimal prices become negative as
soon as
C
Y > 1. Yet, even it recycling costs were considered, this situation would sooner or later arise, if
marginal recycling costs were not increasing fast enough.
19It can be shown that { at least locally { the speed of convergence, as represented
by jj, might be higher or lower in Scenario 2 than in Scenario 1. If  < 1, i.e. when
the substitution eect dominates the income eect, jj always rises such that convergence
in the second scenario is always faster.13 In this case the savings rate falls due to the
eect of the internalization on the marginal product of capital which induces the speed
of convergence to rise. If  > 1 on the other hand, i.e. if the income eect outweighs
the substitution eect, jj could also be lower than in the rst scenario. Whether the
speed of convergence rises or falls, depends crucially on  which determines the strength
of the feedback eect from the material resource markets on output and consumption
development. The more productive recycled waste is in production, i.e. the higher , the
lower is h and the more the recycling market feedbacks aects the development of the
output-capital ratio over time (see also the discussion of (43)). Yet whether or not this
results in a faster adjustment to the steady state, depends on whether the transmission
of the feedback eects via ck or yk dominates. After rewriting (47) in terms of d1 and d2
and taking the derivative of the resulting expression with respect to , it can be shown













= (+  +) + (+   ) Q 0: (48)
In general, the higher the increase of yk that a rise of yk and ck induces, the faster the
economy converges (
@NI
@d2 > 0 and
@NI
@d1 > 0). Yet higher values of  only raise the
reagibility of _ yk with respect to changes of yk, while the reagibility with respect to ck
falls. Depending on which eect is stronger, the speed of convergence rises or falls when
recyclers internalize the feedback eects from recycling. For the intuition of the negative
eect of  on d1 and thereby on the speed of convergence, see the explanation of (43)
above.
For the EKC analysis the speed of convergence matters insofar that a faster transition
process implies that the peak of the EKC from where on waste stocks start to decline is
reached earlier.
13To see this consider the following: Postulating that the negative eigenvalue of Scenario 2 from (45),
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 ^ yk, bNI = 4h(1 )^ ck^ yk and bI = hbNI. We know that bNI > bI
and, for  < 1, aI > aNI > 0. Consequently we can set aI =
p
a2
I and aNI =
p
a2
NI. It is clear that if we
can show (46) to hold for bNI = bI, it also holds for bNI > bI. By rearranging (46) we get
p
a2















I + bI)   a2
I
(47)
which always holds because of the concavity of
p
x, x 2 R.
205 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to extend the debate on Environmental Kuznets
Curves to the case of non-renewable resources and to discuss the driving forces that might
give rise to EKC's in this case.
It was shown that an EKC for non-renewables might arise during the transition to the
long-run balanced growth path. As the driving force behind the emergence of an EKC,
the rising scarcity of these resources in a growing economy was identied. The decreasing
availability of virgin resources in combination with an increasing savings rate during the
development of countries can induce the emergence of an EKC. The increase in the scarcity
of resources results on the one hand from the overall limit on exhaustible resource stocks
and on the other hand from the fact that during development more and more resources
become bound in the man-made capital stock. These bound resources are consequently not
available for future recycling and cannot be reused as an productive input in the future.
Whether or not an EKC arises depends, e.g., on the stage of development an economy has
reached at the beginning of the observed time horizon.
We showed furthermore that the assumptions made about the ability of recycling rms
to actually observe and internalize the development of the waste stock matters. It not
only in
uences under which prerequisites an EKC might arise, but also aects the speed
with which the economy passes through the transitional stages towards a balanced growth
path. Internalization of the interrelation between recycling decisions today and the future
availability of recyclable waste also implies that an economy can be caught in a poverty
trap, i.e. it might not be able to converge to the long-run equilibrium if initially too poorly
endowed with resources and capital.
6 Appendix: Derivation of Linearized Saddle Path
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_ ck = Aet (50)
Using the equation of motion for ck from (37) we can now determine A. Equating the two
expressions for _ ck
Aet = (ck   ^ ck)^ ck  
   

(yk   ^ yk)^ ck;
and solving for A gives
A =  1e t

(ck   ^ ck)^ ck  
   

(yk   ^ yk)^ ck

: (51)





















which is given in (40).
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